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Temporal Theory and US-China Relations
Abstract
This article explains why existing great powers can engage in cooperative relations with
rising great powers that fuel the rise of the latter into competitors. By adopting a temporal
theoretical lens and providing an examination of US-China relations in the post-Cold War
era, it is argued that uncertainty about Chinese long-term intentions, economic benefits
from cooperation, and the existence of other clear and imminent challenges to address
incentivized the US to adopt a cooperative policy towards China. Assertive moves by China
from the late 2000s onwards that the United States perceived to be indications of longterm malign intentions, the emergence of economic competition, and the fading of other
challenges to US interests by the 2010s, removed these incentives for engagement and
consequently led to a change from cooperative to competitive policies. This article is aimed
to address the crucial questions of why the United States helped accelerate the rise of
China into a peer competitor, and why that policy has changed to one in which the United
States now has engaged in strategic competition with China.
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Introduction
The US policy of engagement towards China, John Mearsheimer has
recently argued, is the “worst strategic blunder any country has made in
recent history,” and that there is “no comparable example of a great power
actively fostering the rise of a peer competitor.”1 This article will clarify the
reasons for why great powers, in this case the United States, can engage in
cooperative relations with rising great powers that potentially can become
competitors, such as China.
Through the application of temporal theory of international politics, and
an examination of United States-China relations in the post-Cold War era,
the following article will illustrate, contrary to the predominant argument
in the extant realist literature, that uncertainty about future intentions,
rather than leading existing great powers to implement competitive
policies in the short term, in fact can incentivize them to adopt cooperative
policies towards rising great powers. Cooperative relations and
engagement, it is further argued, is the most desired policy for an existing
great power until the rising great power’s long-term intention becomes a
measurable and clear risk, which subsequently will incentivize the former
to change its strategy from cooperation to competition against the latter.2
The remaining of this article proceeds as following. Next section will
outline temporal theory of international politics in its simplest form and
offer some initial findings from the empirical analysis. The article will then
provide a more comprehensive theory-driven examination of primary and
secondary sources on China-US relations in the post-Cold War era. The
final section provides a summary and conclusion.

Time-Horizons and Rising Great Powers
Temporal theory of international politics provides us with the details to
explain the motivations for cooperation and competition between an
existing and rising great power by considering the impact of timehorizons, defined here as “the degree to which states value the future
versus the present.”3 The now-or-later dilemma is at the core of this
explanatory variable. This dilemma evolves from the option existing great
powers have between:
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1. Launching a preventive strategic competition now to halt and
reverse the emergence of a rising great power into a peer
competitor, based on a worst-case thinking about the rising
great power’s long-term intentions; or
2. To defer any action until a later point in time when the longterm intention of the rising great power becomes measurable
and clear.4
Existing great powers value the future in the former option, while in the
latter they value the present.
In the extant realist literature, it is argued that uncertainty about longterm intentions inevitably will lead states in an anarchic self-help
environment to constantly engage in competition with each other, and that
“this is true in the short term as well as the long-term.”5 Transferring this
argument to our context, it should be expected that existing great powers
constantly will engage in competitive strategies towards rising great
powers to prevent them from becoming peer competitors, simply because
uncertainty about intentions incentivizes the former to act upon worstcase scenarios about the future behavior of the latter. This is
Mearsheimer’s logic briefly.
Temporal theory makes an important distinction between uncertainty and
risk. While uncertainty is something truly unknowable, risk is something
measurable, is possible to assess by examining evidence, and accordingly
acted upon. The transition from uncertainty to risk occurs when
information and knowledge gives State A the possibility to assess whether
the long-term intentions of State B pose a threat or not. The more certain
an existing great power is that a rising great power is a threat to its longterm security, the more motivated it is to value the future and engage in
competitive strategies in the short-term. The more uncertain the existing
great power is about the intentions of the rising great power, the more
likely it is to defer action until intentions becomes clear. By deferring
competition, an existing great power values the present and make
cooperation with a rising great power in the short-term possible to attain.6
According to Edelstein, existing great powers do not a priori assume the
worst about rising great powers’ long-term intentions as argued in the
extant realist literature. They are likewise reluctant to engage in
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competition when they are uncertain about future behavior. The costs for
an existing great power to engage in competition with a rising great power,
based on unknowable intentions, can be unattractive for both domestic
and external political, economic, and strategic reasons. Domestically, a
competitive strategy might unnecessarily drain resources, lead to popular
discontent, self-fulfilling prophecies, and undesired and irreversible
policies. Externally, it might distract the focus of the great power from
other clear and imminent challenges to its security.7 Existing great powers
are therefore more likely to “kick the can down the road” and “look for
opportunities to update any beliefs…about the rising power’s intentions.”8
Based on the preceding argument, temporal theory specifies three main
variables that determines whether an existing great power decides to
launch a preventive strategic competition against a rising great power now
or defers such action until a later point in time. These are:
1. Whether the existing great power is certain about the long-term
intentions of the rising great power;
2. Whether it is possible to attain short-term economic gains by
engaging in cooperative relations with the rising great power;
and
3. Whether there are other clear and more imminent challenges to
the security of the existing great power.9
The more certain that the long-term intentions of the rising great power
pose a threat, the less opportunities for economic benefits from
cooperative relations with the rising great power, and with the absence of
other clear and imminent challenges to address, the more likely it is that
the existing great power will adopt competitive policies in the short-term
to address the clear long-term challenge. Conversely, the more likely it is
that the existing great power will defer competition until a later point in
time and adopt cooperative policies in the short-term.
The now-or-later dilemma provides a novel explanation for why the
United States engaged in what Mearsheimer defines as strategic blunder.10
Uncertainty about China’s long-term intentions, economic benefits from
cooperation, and the clear challenges of globalizing the liberal bounded
order in the post-Cold War era, and addressing the terrorist threat from
the 2001 onwards, incentivized the United States to adopt the later
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dimension of the dilemma. These trends incentivized the United States to
maintain a short time-horizon in its relationship with China, made
pragmatic cooperation with China possible and desirable, and helped fuel
China’s rise. Engagement, as we now commonly define this policy, was by
policymakers and scholars alike believed to be able to influence and induce
change of China’s long-term intentions, whatever they were, in a favorable
direction.11
The emerging perception of China as a potential regional hegemon in the
Indo-Pacific by the late 2000s due to Beijing’s assertive behavior in and
around regional waters (in other words, as uncertainty gave way to clarity,
rightfully or not, about long-term intentions), the advent of economic
competition and decoupling, and the fading terrorist threat from 2010s
onward, removed the incentives that once favored cooperative relations in
the short-term. These developments consequently paved the way for the
United States to abandon its policy of engagement and launch a preventive
strategic competition aimed to address the clear and long-term China
challenge. This preventive strategic competition was launched by the
Obama administration with the Pivot to Asia, and later accelerated with
Trump administrations’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy.12
Whether an existing great power adopts a cooperative or competitive
short-term strategy towards a rising great power also depends on the
behavior of the latter, which also faces its own now-or-later dilemma.
From the preceding argument, it is obvious that rising great powers should
seek to refrain from any action in the short-term that might lead an
existing great power to perceive it as a long-term threat if they want to
realize their potential. To fuel their rise in an interdependent world, rising
great powers are in addition reliant upon economic cooperation with
existing great powers and other developed and rich countries.13 By
focusing on more prosperous and prestigious days ahead, rising great
powers thus benefit from following Deng Xiaoping’s maxim of hiding
capabilities and biding time. Through this maxim, rising great powers can
keep existing great powers uncertain about their long-term intentions in
the service of incentivizing cooperation in the short-term for long-term
gains.14
As the empirical analysis below will illustrate, China successfully managed
to follow this maxim during the early post-Cold War era by refraining from
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any behavior that could provoke the United States, for the purpose of
securing the long-term prosperity and international standing of the
country.15 By signaling benign intentions, opening up for economic
connectivity, taking steps for integration into the liberal international
order and partnering with the United States against global terrorism,
China managed to sway the United States away from adopting competitive
strategies to contain China’s rise. Deng Xiaoping´s reform and openingup, the guideline of hiding capabilities and biding time, and the conception
of peaceful rise are the most important manifestations of this approach.16
There are, however, several downsides and risks with this strategy, thus
making it a real dilemma for a rising great power. The downside this
article will focus on is that too much patience by a rising great power can
embolden other states to act in ways that it regards as threatening to its
rise, thereby incentivizing the rising great power to behave assertively in
the short-term to halt any potential erosion of its position and
consequently raise concerns about its long-term intentions.17 This article
will in particular illustrate how the attempt by regional powers to claim
sovereignty over territories in the South China Sea forced Beijing’s
assertive hand, and how this behavior played an important role in shifting
the United States’ time-horizon and ultimately its decision to launch a
preventive strategic competition to address the long-term China challenge.
Hence, cooperative, and competitive policies between existing and rising
great powers evolves from the interaction between the different timehorizons held by these powers. Cooperative relations are likely to occur
when an existing great power is uncertain about the rising great power’s
long-term intentions and short-term benefits from cooperation are
obtainable, at the same time as the rising great power pursues a policy
aimed to fuel its long-term rise through cooperation and defer from any
immediate action that can raise concerns about its long-term intentions.
Competition, on the other hand, is more likely to occur when the existing
great power focus on the long-term threat posed by a rising great power
and benefits from cooperation is absent, caused primarily the provocative
behavior of the latter that raises concerns about its long-term intentions.18
The proceeding sections will apply temporal theory to examine China-US
relations in the post-Cold War era and provide a discussion to assess the
findings considering the theoretical expectations. The following
5
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examination and discussion are crude and abstract and has been necessary
due to limitations on space and purpose of academic discourse.

Changing Time Horizons in China-US Relations in the postCold War Era
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States adopted a strategy of
liberal hegemony to expand the bounded liberal order it led during the
Cold War to the entire world, a process often also conceptualized as
globalization.19 According to Ikenberry, “American-led rules, institutions,
and relationships that had been built during the Cold War became the core
of the post-Cold War order.”20 The logic behind this expansion was,
according to Mearsheimer, that the globalization of liberal democracy,
strengthening of international institutions, and an open international
economy would, as it had ensured between the Western countries during
the Cold War, facilitate global peace and stability; bring an end to history
as one scholar famously argued.21
At the same time as the Clinton administration expressed uncertainty
about China’s long-term intentions, it was also in a firm belief that the
future trajectory of the evolving liberal international order depended on
the integration of China into it.22 The capstone of the liberal hegemonic
project was, according to Ikenberry, the United States’ invitation to China
to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), and its membership,
according to Tooze, the moment that truly inaugurated the era of modern
globalization.23 Friedman, for instance, similarly argues that the
integration of China into the WTO helped fuel economic globalization,
and, in the words of Ikenberry, made it clear that “the door to China’s
integration into the Western liberal order was open.”24
In addition to help expand the evolving liberal international order and fuel
globalization, integrating China into the liberal international order also
benefitted the US economy. The United States would guarantee continued
access to the thriving domestic market of China, thus securing continued
export for its products, and jobs for its farmers, workers, and companies.25
China had, in fact, become one of the top trading partners of the United
States by the early 2000s. Finally, integration would induce change on
China’s long-term behavior, turning it into a “responsible stakeholder in a
United States led international order.”26
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Although the United States’ drive for liberal hegemony led to concerns in
China about regime survival, it did also provide an opportunity to pursue
the long-term goal of national rejuvenation through integration and
economic interaction with the United States and the developed world.
China’s posture as an order-taker, as exemplified by Deng Xiaoping´s
famous dictum for China to hide its capabilities and bid its time,
emphasized non-provocation, continuation of the reform and opening up
policies from the late Cold War era, and participation in the arrangements
of the liberal international order.27 According to Chen, Chinese
participation into the expanding order was aimed at providing the country
with the possibility to focus on its long-term domestic reforms and
development, an argument also held by Yan who further argues that the
focus also was to prevent the United States from “focusing on containing
the rise of China as a global superpower.”28
There were, however, periods during the 1990s that China behaved in
ways that the United States, and other regional powers in the Indo-Pacific,
perceived as indications of long-term malign intentions, particularly in
relation to the South China Sea and Taiwan. According to Goldstein,
claimants in the South China Sea, and in particular Vietnam and
Philippines, had by 1994 occupied features that strengthened their
positions in the region to the detriment of China as the latter was careful
to not inflame any threat perception.29 China’s patience seemed to
embolden other regional powers, and Beijing was facing the option to:
1.
2.

Either refrain from acting and risk an erosion of its regional
position; or
To act to defend what it perceived as its sovereign right and risk
to raise concerns about its long-term intentions.30

China chose the latter option and between 1994 to 1995 took control over
and later fortified the Mischief Reef, which the Philippines had claimed as
its own territory, to “forestall further erosion of its position.”31
During the same period as Beijing was engaged in assertive actions in the
South China Sea, it did also increasingly fear that the United States was
challenging its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. This perceived challenge
followed US arms sales to the island, upgrading of diplomatic relations in
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violation of existing United States-China agreements, and the decision by
the Clinton administration in 1995 to permit Lee Teng-hui to visit the
United States. Fearing that these developments could eventually embolden
Taiwan to seek independence, China was again facing a now-or-later
dilemma.32 China’s decision was to act immediately and launch large scale
military exercises and missile tests in the waters near the island between
1995 to 1996 to demonstrate resolve and deter any move towards
independence. The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis culminated with the
deployment in March 1996 of two US carrier groups to the area, the largest
ever US naval movement in the region since the Vietnam War.33
Chinese assertiveness, although defensive from the point of view of
Beijing, influenced the perceptions the regional powers, including the
United States, held about China’s long-term intentions negatively, and
accelerated regional security-oriented relationships directed against
Beijing.34 The deteriorating trend in the United States-China bilateral
relationship from the mid-90s onwards did in fact motivate the Bush
administration in 2001 to plan to designate China as the leading strategic
and military competitor of the United States.35
The planned move to adopt a competitive policy against China in the late
1990s and early 2000s was however shelved following the terrorist attacks
in the United States on September 11.36 The national defense strategy from
2002 did instead emphasize that the United States welcome the
emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China as a partner in the
global war against terrorism, and for maintaining international peace and
security in general.37 Sino-US relations following September 11, according
to some observers, was in fact at its most stable in the post-Cold War era.38
There were three main reasons for this. First, the war on terrorism
distracted the United States from the long-term challenge posed by China
by consuming Washington´s short-term attention to address the challenge
posed by radical Islam. According to Walt, the global war on terrorism
“was a giant distraction from a host of broader strategic concerns, most
notably China’s remarkable rise,” an argument also held by Rhodes who
further claims that “China’s ascent in global influence accelerated rapidly
following 9/11.”39 The second reason, as Shambaugh makes clear, was the
Chinese decision to support and forge partnership with the United States
against the global war on terrorism.40 Finally, it was believed that
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continued engagement would incentivize Beijing to change course and
participate in pragmatic cooperation and mutual accommodation on
regional and international security issues.41
China did also do its part to counter the emerging China threat perception,
particularly through the development of the peaceful rise concept from
1996 onward.42 The concept of peaceful rise was expressed, among other
things, through China’s adherence to achieve a peaceful solution to the
South China Sea and Taiwan issues, its active role in developing
multilateral for solving regional and international security challenges,
such as in relation to North Korea, Beijing’s currency policy during the
Asian financial crisis which earned it widespread praise among regional
powers as a responsible actor, through strengthened economic integration
with neighboring countries, particularly with the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), by becoming a member of the WTO, and, finally,
by joining the global war against terrorism.43 As argued by Doshi, these
policies were crucial for securing a continued favorable environment for
national rejuvenation by offsetting any move by the United States, or other
regional powers, to encircle Beijing out of fear for its long-term
intentions.44
Following assertive moves by regional powers over disputes territories in
the South China Sea from 2009 onwards, particularly Vietnam, the
Philippines, and Malaysia, China was again pushed to act assertively to
secure its position in the region or to remain passive.45 While Strangio
argues that Chinese assertiveness was motivated by an increasing
confidence in its political system following the 2008 global financial crisis,
Johnston argues that it was in “response to more proactive diplomacy by
other claimants to establish the legal boundaries of their claims in the
region,” an observation also supported by Edelstein who characterizes
Chinese behavior as “reactive assertiveness,” and Fravel who argues that
China’s posture in the South China Sea was a response to the moves made
by other claimants but that it nevertheless threatened the weaker regional
powers.46 The increasing militarization and tensions in the South China
Sea incentivized United States’ involvement and culminated with
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s rejection of China’s assertive behavior
and territorial claims during an ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi
in 2010.47 By the end of the 2000s, it became increasingly clear that the
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United States was determined to push back against what it began to
perceive as China’s effort to pursue regional hegemony.48
Several other developments in the region during that year, such as the
Diaoyu or Senkaku trawler incident, the North Korean shelling of South
Korean held Yeonpyeong Island which the United States believed China
had emboldened, and Beijing’s distinctly tougher criticism of US military
maneuvers in the region and arms sales to Taiwan, led many observers in
the United States to claim the China was finally revealing is true long-term
intentions.49 One prominent China scholar even defined the year of 2010
as China’s “year of assertiveness.”50 Chinese assertiveness by the turn of
the decade altered the belief that engagement could induce change on
Beijing’s long-term intentions, resulting in an “unceremonious close” for
the policy, according to Campbell and Sullivan.51 That this change followed
Chinese assertiveness in and around regional waters is clarified in the
national security strategy from 2017 where it is stated that “contrary to our
hopes…China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of
others.”52
In addition to the increasing clarity about China’s long-term intentions
and the engagement failed thinking, the economic relationship that once
incentivized cooperation was also starting to fall apart by the mid-2010s.
With China’s steady climb within the global value chain and the ensuing
competition over the commanding heights of the 21st century global
economy, as exemplified by the Made in China 2025 and China Standards
2035 visions, it became less rewarding for the United States to engage with
China economically.53 According to former State Secretary Mike Pompeo,
Washington had to “protect the American economy” from increasing
Chinese competition.54 The economic competition led the United States to
initiate a trade-war in 2018, aimed to deny Chinese companies dominance
over the twenty-first century global economy, leading scholars to argue
that a great deglobalization or decoupling to be in the horizon.55
According to Can and Chan, China’s initiation of the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) in 2015, which the Silk Road Economic Belt, the TwentyFirst Century Maritime Silk Road, and the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank had laid the foundation for, was intended to offset this
evolving China threat perception and maintain a favorable environment
for the continuations of its national rejuvenation.56 By establishing
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political and economic networks of cooperation with regional countries,
China sought to continue to reinforce the conception of peaceful rise and
reform and opening-up. Although the initiative managed to attract
participants and reinvigorate China’s image as a responsible rising great
power in the region, the BRI was from the perspective of policymakers in
the United States further evidence of China’s desire to forge a Beijingcentered regional order and supplant US strategic influence in the IndoPacific: In the eyes of policymakers in the United States it became
increasingly clear that China was a revisionist power, and that Beijing’s
long-term intention was to replace the United States and challenge the
existing arrangements of the liberal international order.57
These developments, which removed crucial incentives for cooperation
with China, coincided with the declining threat of Islamic terrorism and
the consequent desire in the United States to undo its military footprint in
the Greater Middle East, ultimately paving the way for Washington to
adjust its short-term policy to address the long-term China challenge. In
the words of then Secretary of State Clinton, the future of politics would be
decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq. According to Tooze, “it was time
to raise the strategic horizon from Basra and Helmand to the great power
challenge of…China,” while Kurt Campbell, the China tzar in the Biden
administration, argued for a “movement from the Middle East…but a
much greater focus on the Indo-Pacific.”58 Biden himself defended the
withdrawal from Afghanistan in mid-2021 by arguing that the United
States now needed to “focus on shoring up America´s core strengths to
meet the strategic competition with China.”59 “We have now retuned to the
principal reality of world affairs,” according to an observer
commemorating the 20th anniversary of September 11.60
The Obama administrations’ launch of the Pivot to Asia was the manifest
of this shift in the United States time-horizon and the consequent change
from pragmatic cooperation to preventive strategic competition as the
defining characteristic in short-term relations. The preventive strategic
competition was followed up and accelerated by the Trump administration
through the FOIP strategy. The Biden administration has doubled-down
the FOIP strategy, ultimately aimed to contain and deny China regional
dominance.61
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Conclusion
This article provided a theoretical explanation for existing great power
motivation to engage in cooperative relations with rising great powers that
fuel the latter’s rise into competitors. By adopting a temporal theoretical
lens to examine fluctuations in United States-China relations, the article
illustrated that the different time-horizon of the United States and China
shaped cooperative and competitive bilateral relations in the post-Cold
War era.
Short time-horizon in the United States and a long time-horizon in China
secured cooperative relations and the emergence of China into a great
power competitor. Uncertainty about China’s long-term intentions,
economic benefits from cooperation, and the existence of other clear and
more imminent challenges to address incentivized the short time-horizon
in the United States. The need to secure a peaceful and favorable
environment for the long-term national rejuvenation into a great power,
on the other hand, provided China with the motivation to maintain a long
time-horizon. Similarly, Brand and Beckley have recently argued that
China’s emergence as a great power competitor has been possible due to a
“secure geopolitical environment and easy access to foreign markets and
technology, all underpinned by friendly relations with the United States.
And China’s government skillfully harnessed these advantages by carrying
out a process of economic reform and opening.”62
Increasing perception of China as a revisionist power bent on regional
dominance, coupled with an engagement failed thinking and economic
competition, in addition to the fading of other imminent challenges to
address, led to a change in US time-horizon in its dealings with China.
From being uncertain about long-term intentions and valuing short-term
gains, the United States is now focusing on the long-term China challenge.
Strategic competition, rather than cooperation, has become the new
normal in United States-China relations.63 Different time-horizons in the
bilateral relationship will continue to shape the future trajectory of United
States-China relations, rather than power related variables alone.
Perceived risks, economic incentives, and imminent challenges, as should
be clear by now, influence time-horizons as much as material capabilities.
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The more the United States perceives China as a revisionist power due to
assertive moves by Beijing, and the less economic benefits it receives from
cooperation in the absence of other clear and imminent challenges to
address, the more likely it is to intensify competition to address what it
perceives as a long-term China challenge. China, on the other hand, can
reduce the incentives for the United States to intensify competitive policies
if it manages to continue its peaceful rise and refrain from unilateral and
assertive moves in and around regional waters, and through the
continuation of its policy of reform and opening-up. Through these steps,
China can reduce perceived risk of threat and provide economic benefits
for cooperation. An additional opportunity for China in the mid- to longterm will be to partner with the United States to address the increasingly
clear challenge of climate change.
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